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Abstract
We study private broadcasting of two messages to two groups of receivers over independent parallel channels.
One group consists of an arbitrary number of receivers interested in a common message, whereas the other group
has only one receiver. Each message must be kept confidential from the receiver(s) in the other group. Each of the
sub-channels is degraded, but the order of receivers on each channel can be different. While corner points of the
capacity region were characterized in earlier works, we establish the capacity region and show the optimality of
a superposition strategy. For the case of parallel Gaussian channels, we show that a Gaussian input distribution is
optimal. We also discuss an extension of our setup to broadcasting over a block-fading channel and demonstrate
significant performance gains using the proposed scheme over a baseline time-sharing scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a considerable amount of interest in recent years in exploiting the properties of fading wireless
channels for transmission of confidential messages (see e.g., [1]–[6] and references therein). Such studies have
lead to new coding techniques such as the variable rate extension of the wiretap codebook [1], secure product
codebooks [7] and secure multicast codebooks [4]. In the present work we study a setup where a single transmitter
needs to serve two groups of receivers over a block-fading channel. There are K receivers in group 1, all
interested in a common message, whereas there is a single receiver in group 2. The message of group 1 must
be kept confidential from the group 2 receiver, whereas the message of group 2 must be kept confidential from
group 1. We will refer to this setup as private broadcasting. In related work, references [8]–[10] study private
broadcasting when there is one receiver in each group. References [11], [12] study private broadcasting with
feedback over erasure and MIMO broadcast channels. Reference [13] studies interference alignment techniques
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2for private broadcasting. In this paper we focus on the case when there are M independent, parallel and degraded
sub-channels and thereafter treat the natural extension to block-fading channels.
Our setup reduces to previously known results at the corner points of the capacity region. When we only need
to transmit the message for group 1, with the group 2 receiver as the only eavesdropper, the capacity can be
achieved using a secure multicast codebook [4]. Instead, when we only need to transmit the message for group
2, with all receivers in group 1 as eavesdroppers, the capacity can be achieved using a secure product codebook
[7]. Interestingly the secure multicast and secure product codebook constructions are based on different ideas. A
secure multicast codebook consists of M sub-codebooks, one for each channel. Each sub-codebook is a wiretap
codebook [14], has the same rate as the transmitted message and guarantees confidentiality of the message from
the eavesdropper on its respective link. The secure multicast construction guarantees that the legitimate receiver
can decode the message by using the output of all the channels. Furthermore the message remains confidential
from the eavesdropper even when all the channel outputs are combined. While the secure product codebook also
uses one sub-codebook for each sub-channel, the rate of each sub-codebook equals the capacity of the legitimate
receiver on that sub-channel. The secure product codebook takes a cartesian product of these codebooks and
then applies the wiretap construction to this product codebook. This guarantees that the output codeword on
any given sub-channel is (nearly) independent of the output codewords on other sub-channels. This limits the
amount of information that gets leaked to an eavesdropper on any given sub-channel. Both the secure multicast
codebook and secure product codebook result in a higher rate than a vector extension of the wiretap codebook
to parallel channels.
In this paper we study the case when both the messages need to be simultaneously transmitted. We find that
a superposition construction achieves the entire capacity region. The proposed construction imposes a particular
layering order for the secure multicast and secure product codebooks. The codewords in each sub-codebook of
the secure product codebook must constitute the cloud centers, whereas the codewords in the associated sub-
codebook of the secure multicast codebook must constitute satellite codewords. The optimality of such a layered
coding scheme was somewhat unexpected. In absence of secrecy constraints, to the best of our knowledge the
capacity region in the proposed setup remains open, even though the corner points are known [15]. We will
provide an explanation on the sufficiency of the superposition approach after presenting the coding scheme in
section III.
For the case of independent Gaussian sub-channels, we further establish that a Gaussian input distribution is
optimal. The proof involves obtaining a Lagrangian dual for every boundary point of the capacity region and
then using an extremal inequality [16], [17] to show that the expression is maximized using Gaussian inputs.
The result for the Gaussian channels are extended to a block-fading channel model using suitable quantization
of the channel gains. We numerically evaluate the rate region for a sub-optimal power allocation and observe
significant gains over a naive time-sharing approach.
3II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MAIN RESULTS
A. Independent Parallel Channels
Our setup involves M independent parallel sub-channels and two groups of receivers. There are K receivers
in group 1 and one receiver in group 2. The output symbols at receiver k in group 1 across the M sub-channels
is denoted by
yk = (yk,1, yk,2, . . . , yk,M ), k = 1, 2 . . . ,K, (1)
whereas the output symbols of the group 2 receiver across the M sub-channels are denoted by
z = (z1, z2, . . . , zM ), (2)
and the channel input symbols are denoted by x = (x1, . . . , xM ).
Each sub-channel is a degraded broadcast channel. The degradation on sub-channel i can be expressed as
xi → ypii(1),i · · · ypii(li),i → zi → ypii(li+1),i · · · ypii(K),i, (3)
for some permutation {pii(1), . . . , pii(K)} of the set {1, . . . ,K}.
We intend to transmit message m1 to receivers 1, . . . ,K in group 1, while the message m2 must be transmitted
to the receiver in group 2. A length-n private broadcast code encodes a message pair (m1,m2) ∈ [1, 2nR1] ×
[1, 2nR2 ] into a sequence xn such that Pr(m1 6= mˆ1,k) ≤ εn, and Pr(m2 6= mˆ2) ≤ εn, and furthermore the
secrecy constraints
1
n
I(m1; z
n) ≤ εn,
1
n
I(m2; y
n
k ) ≤ εn, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, (4)
are also satisfied. Here {εn} approaches zero as n→∞. The capacity region consists of the set of all rate pairs
(R1, R2) achieved by some private broadcast code. The following Theorem characterizes this region.
Theorem 1: Let auxiliary variables {ui}1≤i≤M satisfy the Markov condition
ui → xi → ypii(1),i · · · ypii(li),i → zi → ypii(li+1),i · · · ypii(K),i. (5)
The capacity region is given by the union of all rate pairs (R1, R2) that satisfy the following constraints:
R1 ≤ min
1≤k≤K
{
M∑
i=1
I(xi; yk,i|ui, zi)
}
(6)
R2 ≤ min
1≤k≤K
{
M∑
i=1
I(ui; zi|yk,i)
}
(7)
for some choice of {ui}1≤i≤M that satisfy (5). The alphabet of ui satisfies the cardinality constraint |Ui| ≤
|Xi|+ 2K − 1. ✷
The coding theorem and converse for Theorem 1 are presented in section III and IV respectively.
4B. Gaussian Channels
Consider the discrete-time real Gaussian model where the channel output over sub-channel i at time index t
is given by
yk,i(t) = xi(t) + nk,i(t) (8)
zi(t) = xi(t) + wi(t), t = 1, . . . , T. (9)
The additive noise vectors nk,i = (nk,i(1), · · · , nk,i(T )) and wi = (wi(1), · · · ,wi(T )) have entries that are
sampled i.i.d. N (0, σ2k,i) and N (0, δ2i ), respectively. Since the capacity region of the channel depends on the
joint distribution of the additive noise (n1,i(t), . . . , nK,i(t),wi(t)) only through the marginals and that Gaussian
variables are infinitely divisible, without loss of generality we may assume that for each sub-channel i the
receivers are degraded as expressed in (3). We shall consider both the per sub-channel average power constraint
1
T
E
[
‖xi‖
2
]
≤ Pi, ∀i = 1, . . . ,M (10)
and the total average power constraint
1
T
M∑
i=1
E
[
‖xi‖
2
]
≤ P (11)
where xi = (xi(1), · · · , xi(T )) is the input vector for sub-channel i.
Theorem 2: The capacity region under the per sub-channel average power constraint (10) is given by the
union of all rate pairs (R1, R2) that satisfy the following constraints:
R1 ≤ min
1≤k≤K
{
M∑
i=1
A
(1)
k,i (Q)
}
(12)
R2 ≤ min
1≤k≤K
{
M∑
i=1
A
(2)
k,i (Q)
}
(13)
for some power vector Q = (Q1, . . . , QM ), where 0 ≤ Qi ≤ Pi for all i = 1, . . . ,M ,
A
(1)
k,i (Q) :=
[
1
2
log
(
Qi + σ
2
k,i
σ2k,i
)
−
1
2
log
(
Qi + δ
2
i
δ2i
)]+
(14)
A
(2)
k,i (Q) :=
[
1
2
log
(
Pi + δ
2
i
Qi + δ2i
)
−
1
2
log
(
Pi + σ
2
k,i
Qi + σ2k,i
)]+
(15)
and x+ := max{x, 0}. ✷
A proof of Theorem 2 is provided in section V.
Corollary 1: The capacity region under the total average power constraint (11) is given by the union of all
rate pairs (R1, R2) that satisfy the constraints (12) and (13) for some power vectors P = (P1, . . . , PM ) and
Q = (Q1, . . . , QM ), where 0 ≤ Qi ≤ Pi for all i = 1, . . . ,M and
∑M
i=1 Pi ≤ P . ✷
The above corollary follows directly from Theorem 2 and the well-known connection between the per sub-
channel and the total average power constraints. We will not provide a proof of Corollary 1.
5C. Fading Channels
We consider a block-fading channel model with a coherence period of T complex symbols. The channel
output in coherence block i is given by
yk(i) = hk(i)x(i) + nk(i) (16)
z(i) = g(i)x(i) +w(i), i = 1, 2 . . . ,M (17)
where the channel gains hk(i) of the K receivers in group 1 and the channel gain g(i) of the group 2 receiver
are sampled independently in each coherence block i and stay constant throughout the block. The coherence
period T will be taken to be sufficiently large so that random coding arguments can be invoke in each coherence
block. The channel input x(i) ∈ CT satisfies a long-term average power constraint
E
[
1
MT
M∑
i=1
||x(i)||2
]
≤ P (18)
whereas the additive noise vectors nk(i) and w(i) have entries that are sampled i.i.d. CN (0, 1). We are interested
in the ergodic communication scenario where the number of blocks M used for communication can be arbitrarily
large. Furthermore we assume that the channel gains in each coherence block are revealed to all terminals
including the transmitter at the beginning of each coherence block.
Theorem 3: The private broadcasting capacity region for the fading channel model consists of all rate pairs
(R1, R2) that satisfy the following constraints:
R1 ≤ min
1≤k≤K
E
[{
log
(
1 +Q(h, g)|hk|
2
1 +Q(h, g)|g |2
)}+]
, (19)
R2 ≤ min
1≤k≤K
E

{log(1 + P (h, g)|g |2
1 +Q(h, g)|g |2
)
− log
(
1 + P (h, g)|hk|2
1 +Q(h, g)|hk|2
)}+ , (20)
for some power allocation functions P (h, g) and Q(h, g) that satisfy 0 ≤ Q(h, g) ≤ P (h, g) for all (h, g) ∈
CK+1, and E[P (h, g)] ≤ P , where h := (h1, . . . , hK) denotes the channel gains of the receivers in group 1. ✷
A proof of Theorem 3 is provided in Section VI.
Theorems 1, 2 and 3 constitute the main results in this paper.
III. CODING THEOREM
The basic idea behind our coding scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1. The message m2 is encoded using a product
codebook [1], [7], whose codewords are obtained by taking cartesian product of the M codebooks, one for
each of the parallel channels. The message m1 is encoded using a multicast codebook [4], also consisting of
M codebooks. As shown in Fig. 1, the codewords of the product-codebook constitute cloud centers of the
superposition codebook, whereas the codewords of the multicast codebook constitute the satellite codewords.
We describe the details of our construction in the following sub-sections.
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Fig. 1: Superposition construction for the case of two channels. The product codebook for the group 2 user is
obtained by taking a cartesian C21 × C22 of two independently generated codebooks and binning the resulting
codeword pairs. The multicast codebook is generated, conditioned on the codewords of C21 and C22.
A. Product-Codebook Construction
The message m2 is encoded using a product codebook [1], [7]. Let M2,i be the set of all binary sequences
of length N2,i = n(I(ui; zi)− 2ε) i.e.,
M2,i := {0, 1}
N2,i. (21)
On channel i, we generate a codebook C2,i :M2,i → Uni consisting of |M2,i| codewords, i.e.,
C2,i :=
{
uni (m¯2,i) : m¯2,i ∈
[
1, 2N2,i
]}
, (22)
where each sequence uni is sampled i.i.d. from the distribution pui(·). Let
M2 :=M2,1 ×M2,2 × . . .×M2,M (23)
=
{
(m¯2,1, . . . , m¯2,M ) : m¯2,i ∈ {0, 1}
Ni, i = 1, . . . ,M
}
. (24)
As shown in Fig. 1, we partition the set M2 into 2nR2 bins such that there are L2 = 2n{
∑M
i=1
I(ui;zi)−R2−Mε}
sequences in each bin. Each bin corresponds to one message m2 ∈ [1, 2nR2]. Thus given a message m2 the
encoder selects one sequence (m¯2,1, . . . , m¯2,M ) ∈ M2 uniformly at random from the corresponding bin. On
channel i we select the codeword uni ∈ C2,i associated with m¯2,i. We note that from our construction, each
7sequence in M2 is equally likely i.e.,
Pr(m¯2,1 = m¯2,1, . . . , m¯2,M = m¯2,M ) =
M∏
j=1
Pr(m¯2,j = m¯2,j) =
1
|M2,1| × |M2,2| . . . , |M2,M |
. (25)
B. Multicast-Code Construction
The codebook associated with m1 is a secure multicast codebook [4]. For each uni ∈ C2,i, and each
m1 ∈ [1, 2nR1 ] we construct a codebook C1,i(uni ,m1) consisting of a total of L1,i = 2n(I(xi;zi|ui)+ε) codeword
sequences of length n, each sampled i.i.d. from the distribution
∏n
j=1 pxi|ui(xij |uij).
Let l1,i be uniformly distributed over [1, L1,i]. Given a message m1 ∈ [1, 2nR1 ] and codewords (un1 , . . . , unM ),
selected in the base layer, we select the sequence xni from the codebook C1,i(uni ,m1) corresponding to the
randomly and uniformly generated index l1,i. The sequence xni is transmitted on sub-channel i.
The following property will be useful in our subsequent analysis.
Lemma 1: The sequences (xn1 , xn2 , . . . , xnM ) are conditionally independent given m1.
Proof: Note that
p(xn1 , . . . , x
n
M |m1) =
∑
{m¯2,i}
p(xn1 , . . . , x
n
M , m¯2,1, . . . , m¯2,M |m1) (26)
=
∑
{m¯2,i}
p(xn1 , . . . , x
n
M |m1, m¯2,1, . . . , m¯2,M )p(m¯2,1, . . . , m¯2,M ) (27)
=
∑
{m¯2,i}
p(xn1 , . . . , x
n
M |m1, m¯2,1, . . . , m¯2,M )p(m¯2,1) . . . p(m¯2,M ) (28)
=
∑
{m¯2,i}
p(xn1 |m1, m¯2,1) . . . p(x
n
M |m1, m¯2,M )p(m¯2,1) . . . p(m¯2,M ) (29)
=
M∏
i=1
∑
m¯2,i
p(xni |m1, m¯2,i)p(m¯2,i) (30)
=
M∏
i=1
∑
m¯2,i
p(xni , m¯2,i|m1) (31)
=
M∏
i=1
p(xni |m1) (32)
where (27) follows from the fact that the messages m¯2,1, . . . , m¯2,M are independent of m1; (28) follows from
the fact that the messages satisfy (25); (29) follows from the fact that each xni ∈ C1,i(m1, uni ) and uni is a
function of m¯2,i. Eq. (32) establishes the conditional independence of the messages and completes the proof.
8C. Decoding and Error Analysis
1) Decoding of Message m1: Receiver k in group 1 selects those sub-channels Jk where it is stronger than
the group 2 receiver:
Jk =
{
i ∈ [1,M ] : xi → yk,i → zi
}
(33)
• For each i ∈ Jk, receiver k selects a sequence uˆni ∈ C2,i such that1 (uˆni , ynk,i) ∈ T nε (ui, yk,i). We define
Ek as the event that there exists some i ∈ Jk such that {uˆni 6= uni }.
• Receiver k then searches for a message mˆ1 ∈ [1, 2nR1 ] with the following property: for each i ∈ Jk
there exists a codeword xni ∈ C1,i(m1, uˆni ) such that (xni , ynk,i) ∈ T nε (xi, yk,i|ui). An error is declared if
mˆ1 6= m1.
Now observe that
Pr(mˆ1 6= m1) ≤ Pr(Ek) + Pr(mˆ1 6= m1|E
c
k). (34)
Since |C2,i| ≤ 2n(I(ui;zi)−ε) and I(ui; yk,i) ≥ I(ui; zi) for each i ∈ Jk, it follows that Pr(Ek) ≤Mε.
To bound the second term in (34) we use the union bound and analysis of typical events.
Pr(mˆ1 6= m1|E
c
k) ≤ 2
nR1
∏
i∈Jk
{
|C1,i| 2
−n(I(xi;yk,i|ui)−ε)
}
(35)
≤ 2nR12−n
∑
i∈Jk
(I(xi;yk,i|ui)−I(xi;zi|ui)−2ε) (36)
= 2nR12
−n
∑
i∈Jk
(I(xi;yk,i|ui,zi)−2ε) (37)
which goes to zero provided that R1 ≤
∑
i∈Jk
I(xi; yk,i|ui, zi)−(2M+1)ε. Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, our choice
of R1 in (6) thus guarantees that the error probability associated with message m1 vanishes to zero.
2) Decoding of message m2: The receiver in group 2 decodes message m¯2,i on sub-channel i by searching
for a sequence uni ∈ C2,i that is jointly typical with zni . Since the number of codewords in C2,i does not exceed
2n(I(ui;zi)−2ε), this event succeeds with high probability. Hence the receiver correctly decodes (m¯2,1, . . . , m¯2,M )
and in turn message m2 with high probability.
D. Secrecy Analysis
In order to establish the secrecy of message m1 we need to show that
1
n
I(m1; z
n|C) ≤ εn (38)
Using Lemma 1 and the fact that the channels are independent, we have that zn1 , . . . , znM are conditionally
independent given m1. It follows that
1
n
I(m1; z
n|C) ≤
M∑
i=1
I(m1; z
n
i |C). (39)
1We will use the notion of strong typicality. The set Tn
ε
(x , y) denotes the ε-strongly typical set.
9Since in our conditional codebook construction, there are 2n(I(xi;zi|ui)+ε) sequences in each codebook C1,i(uni ,m1),
it follows from standard arguments that 1
n
I(m1; z
n
i |C) ≤ εn. The secrecy constraint (38) now follows.
To establish secrecy of message m2 with respect to user 1 in group 1, we show that
1
n
H(m2|y
n
1 ,m1) ≥ R2 − εn. (40)
where for simplicity we drop the subscript associated with user 1 in the sequence yn1 . Without loss of generality,
we assume that sub-channels i = 1, 2, . . . , L satisfy xi → zi → yi while sub-channels i = L+1, . . . ,M satisfy
xi → yi → zi. Now consider
H(m2|y
n
1 ,m1) = H(m2|y
n
1 , . . . , y
n
M ,m1) (41)
= H(m¯M2,1|y
n
1 , . . . , y
n
M ,m1)−H(m¯
M
2,1|m2,m1, y
n
1 , . . . , y
n
M ) (42)
=
M∑
j=1
H(m¯2,j |y
n
j ,m1)−H(m¯
M
2,1|m2,m1, y
n
1 , . . . , y
n
M ) (43)
≥
L∑
j=1
H(m¯2,j |y
n
j ,m1)−H(m¯
M
2,1|m2,m1, y
n
1 , . . . , y
n
M ) (44)
where (43) follows by establishing that the collection of pairs {(m2,1, yn1 ), . . . , (m2,M , ynM )} is conditionally
independent given m1, which can be establishes in a manner similar to the proof of Lemma 1 and (44) follows
from the fact that the entropy function is non-negative and therefore we can drop the terms L + 1, . . . ,M in
the first summation.
We lower bound the first term in (44). Recall that m¯2,j is uniformly distributed over C2,j with |C2,j| =
2n(I(uj;zj)−ε). Furthermore, the corresponding codeword unj is the base codeword in C1,j(m1, unj ) and∣∣C1,j(m1, unj )∣∣ = 2n(I(xj ;zj|uj)−ε) ≥ 2n(I(xj ;yj |uj)−ε),
since the channel satisfies the relation xj → zj → yj for j = 1, . . . , L. Since the satellite codeword xnj is
uniformly selected from C1,j it follows that [18, Remark 22.2, pp. 554-555]
1
n
H(m¯2,j |y
n
j ,m1) ≥ I(uj ; zj)− I(uj ; yj)− ε. (45)
and therefore using the fact that uj → zj → yj , we have
1
n
L∑
j=1
H(m¯2,j |y
n
j ,m1) ≥
L∑
j=1
I(uj ; zj |yj)− Lε. (46)
We next upper bound the second term in (44). Note that
H(m¯M2,1|m2,m1, y
n
1 , . . . , y
n
M ) ≤ H(m¯
M
2,1|m2,m1, y
n
1 , . . . , y
n
L , z
n
L+1, . . . z
n
M ) (47)
since znj is a degraded version of ynj on channels j ∈ {L+ 1, . . . ,M}. Also note that
R˜ =
1
n
H(m¯2,1, . . . , m¯2,M ) (48)
10
=
1
n
M∑
i=1
H(m¯2,i) (49)
=
M∑
i=1
{I(ui; zi)− 2ε} , (50)
where we use the fact that the messages (m¯2,1, . . . , m¯2,M ) are mutually independent (c.f. (25)). Furthermore
we select
R2 =
1
n
H(m2) (51)
≤
L∑
i=1
I(ui; zi|yi)− (2M + 1)ε. (52)
Note that
R˜−R2 >
L∑
i=1
I(ui; yi) +
M∑
i=L+1
I(ui; zi) (53)
= I(u1, . . . , uM ; y1, . . . , yL, zL+1, . . . , zM ) (54)
where the last step follows from the fact that we have selected u1, . . . , uM to be mutually independent and the
channels are also independent. We can therefore conclude that (c.f. [18, Lemma 22.1, Remark 22.2, pp. 554-555],
[19, Lemma 1])
1
n
H(m¯M2,1|m2,m1, y
n
1 , . . . , y
n
L , z
n
L+1, . . . z
n
M )
≤ R˜−R2 − I(u1, . . . , uM ; y1, . . . , yL, zL+1, . . . , zM ) + ε (55)
=
L∑
i=1
I(ui; zi|yi)−R2 + ε. (56)
Substituting (46) and (56) into (44) we have that
1
n
H(m2|y
n
1 ,m1) ≥ R2 − (L+ 1)ε, (57)
Since ε > 0 can be arbitrarily small, this establishes the secrecy of message m2 with respect to user 1 in group
1. The secrecy with respect to every other user can be established in a similar fashion.
Remark 1: The superposition approach uses the codewords for the group 2 user as cloud centers and the
codewords of the group 1 user as satellite codewords. To justify this, note that on any given channel, say
channel i, there is an ordering of receivers as in (3). Receivers {pii(li+1), . . . , pi(K)} belonging to group 1 that
are weaker than the group 2 user. It can be seen that these receivers do not learn any information on channel
i. Thus among all the set of active users on any given channel, the group 2 user is the weakest user. Therefore
the associated codeword of the group 2 user constitutes the cloud center.
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IV. CONVERSE
We first show that there exists a choice of auxiliary variables ui(j) that satisfy the Markov chain condition
ui(j)→ xi(j)→ ypi(1),i(j) · · · ypi(li),i(j)→ zi(j)→ ypi(li+1),i(j) · · · ypi(K),i(j). (58)
such that the rates R1 and R2 are upper bounded by
nR1 ≤
M∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
I(xi(j); yk,i(j)|ui(j), zi(j)) + 2nεn (59)
nR2 ≤
M∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
I(ui(j); zi(j)|yk,i(j)) + 2nεn (60)
for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
In particular we show that the choice of ui(j) is given by the following:
ui(j) =
{
m2, Z¯
n
\i, z¯
n
i,j+1, z¯
j−1
i
}
(61)
where we introduce (c.f. (58))
z¯ni := (z
n
i , y
n
pi(li+1),i
, . . . , ynpi(K),i), (62)
Z¯n\i := (z¯
n
1 , . . . , z¯
n
i−1, z¯
n
i+1, . . . , z¯
n
M ), (63)
z¯
j−1
i := (z
j−1
i , y
j−1
pi(li+1),i
, . . . , y j−1
pi(K),i), (64)
z¯ni,j+1 := (z
n
i,j+1, y
n
pi(li+1),i,j+1
, . . . , ynpi(K),i,j+1), (65)
and observe our choice of ui(j) in (61) indeed satisfies (58). Note that z¯ni is the collection of the Group 2
receiver’s channel output as well as the output of all the receivers {pi(li + 1), . . . , pi(K)} in Group 1 that are
degraded with respect to the group 2 receiver on channel i.
We begin with the secrecy constraint associated with message m2 with respect to user k in group 1. Let us
define the following:
y¯nk,i :=


ynk,i, xk → zi → yk,i
zni , xk → yk,i → zi,
(66)
y¯nk := (y¯
n
k,1, . . . , y¯
n
k,M ), z
n := (zn1 , . . . , z
n
M ), (67)
y¯nk,i := (y¯
n
k,1, . . . , y¯
n
k,i), z
n
i := (z
n
1 , . . . , z
n
i ). (68)
Thus y¯nk corresponds to a weaker receiver, whose output on channel i is degraded to zni , if user k is stronger
than the group 2 user on this sub-channel. Clearly we have that 1
n
I(m2; y¯
n
k ) ≤ εn whenever
1
n
I(m2; y
n
k ) ≤ εn.
We thus have
n(R2 − 2εn) ≤ I(m2; z
n)− I(m2; y¯
n
k ) (69)
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≤ I(m2; z
n|y¯nk ) (70)
=
M∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
I(m2; zi(j)|z
j−1
i , z
n
i−1, y¯
n
k ) (71)
≤
M∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
I(m2, z
j−1
i , z
n
i,j+1, z
n
i−1, y¯
n
k\i, y¯
j−1
k,i , y¯
n
k,i,j+1; zi(j)|y¯k,i(j)) (72)
≤
M∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
I(m2, Z¯
n
\i, z¯
n
i,j+1, z¯
j−1
i ; zi(j)|y¯k,i(j)) (73)
=
M∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
I(ui(j); zi(j)|y¯k,i(j)) (74)
=
M∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
I(ui(j); zi(j)|yk,i(j)) (75)
where (73) follows from the fact that
(zni−1, y¯
n
k\i) ⊆ Z¯
n
\i, (z
j−1
i , y¯
j−1
k,i ) ⊆ z¯
j−1
i , (z
n
i,j+1, y¯
n
k,i,j+1) ⊆ z¯
n
i,j+1, (76)
and (75) follows from the fact whenever yk,i(j) 6= y¯k,i(j) then zi(j) is a degraded version of yk,i(j) and
from (66), we have that
I(ui(j); zi(j)|yk,i(j)) = I(ui(j); zi(j)|y¯k,i(j)) = 0. (77)
This establishes (60).
Next, we upper bound R1 as follows:
n(R1 − 2εn) ≤ I(m1; y
n
k )− I(m1; z
n,m2) (78)
≤ I(m1; y
n
k |z
n,m2) (79)
≤
M∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
I(m1; yk,i(j)|y
j−1
k,i , y
n
k,i−1, z
n,m2) (80)
≤
M∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
H(yk,i(j)|y
j−1
k,i , y
n
k,i−1, z
n,m2)−H(yk,i(j)|y
j−1
k,i , y
n
k,i−1, z
n,m1,m2, xi(j)) (81)
=
M∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
H(yk,i(j)|y
j−1
k,i , y
n
k,i−1, z
n,m2)−H(yk,i(j)|xi(j), zi(j)) (82)
≤
M∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
H(yk,i(j)|z
n,m2)−H(yk,i(j)|xi(j), zi(j)) (83)
=
M∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
H(yk,i(j)|Z¯
n
\i, z¯
j−1
i , z¯
n
i,j+1, zi(j),m2)−H(yk,i(j)|xi(j), zi(j)) (84)
=
M∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
H(yk,i(j)|ui(j), zi(j))−H(yk,i(j)|xi(j), zi(j), ui(j)) (85)
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=
M∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
I(xi(j); yk,i(j)|ui(j), zi(j)), (86)
where (82) follows from the fact that for our channel model (yk,i(j), zi(j)) are independent of all other random
variables given xi(j) whereas (84) follows from the fact that even though zn ⊆ {Z¯n\i, z¯j−1i , z¯ni,j+1, zi(j)} holds,
the additional elements in the latter are only a degraded version of zn. This establishes (59).
To complete the converse, let qi to be a random variable uniformly distributed over the set {1, 2, . . . , n} and
furthermore we let ui = (ui(qi), qi), xi = xi(qi) etc. Then (59) and (60) can be reduced to
R1 − 2εn ≤
M∑
i=1
I(xi; yk,i|ui, zi, qi) =
M∑
i=1
I(xi; yk,i|ui, zi) (87)
R2 − 2εn ≤
M∑
i=1
I(ui; zi|yk,i, qi) ≤
M∑
i=1
I(ui; zi|yk,i). (88)
The upper bound on the cardinality of Ui follows by a straightforward application of Caratheodory’s theorem
and the proof is omitted.
A. Special case of K = 2 receivers
For the case when there are K = 2 receivers, the upper bound can be obtained via an alternative approach
which involves first obtaining single-letter bounds for a particular genie-aided channel and then combining these
bounds in a suitable manner.
In particular, suppose that we only need to transmit message m1 to receiver 1 in group 1 and that the message
m2 only needs to be secure from user 2 in group 1. Under these relaxed constraints, it can be shown that any
achievable rate pair (R1, R2) must satisfy:
R1 ≤
M∑
i=1
I(xi; y1,i|zi, ui), R2 ≤
M∑
i=1
I(ui; zi|y2,i), (89)
for some auxiliary variables {ui}1≤i≤M that satisfy the Markov chain in (58). Similarly if we instead consider
transmitting message m1 only to user 2 in group 1 and require secrecy of m2 only with respect to user 1 in
group 1, it can be shown that any achievable rate pair (R1, R2) must satisfy:
R1 ≤
M∑
i=1
I(xi; y2,i|zi, vi), R2 ≤
M∑
i=1
I(vi; zi|y1,i). (90)
for some auxiliary variables {vi}1≤i≤M . Next, we show that on each sub-channel i we can always set ui = vi
without affecting the upper bound. In particular we consider the following four cases:
• Group 2 receiver satisfies xi → zi → (y1,i, y2,i): It suffices to take ui = vi = xi in (89) and (90) as the
contribution of this sub-channel in the expressions for R1 is always zero.
• Group 2 receiver satisfies xi → (y1,i, y2,i) → zi: It suffices to take ui = vi = 0 since the contribution of
this sub-channel in the expressions for R2 is zero.
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• Group 2 receiver satisfies xi → y1,i → zi → y2,i: Since the contribution of sub-channel i in the expressions
of both R1 and R2 in (90) is zero, we can set vi = ui without affecting the upper bound.
• Group 2 receiver satisfies xi → y2,i → zi → y1,i: Since the contribution of sub-channel i in the expressions
of both R1 and R2 in (89) is zero, we can set ui = vi without affecting the upper bound.
Thus we need no more than one non-trivial auxiliary variable on each sub-channel. Setting vi = ui in (90) we
have
R1 ≤
M∑
i=1
I(xi; y2,i|zi, ui), R2 ≤
M∑
i=1
I(ui; zi|y1,i). (91)
The converse follows by combining (89) and (91).
Unfortunately when there are more than two receivers in group 1, we have not been able to obtain the converse
directly from such single-letter expressions. Therefore our approach in the previous section was to identify a
single auxiliary random variable ui as in (61) that is simultaneously compatible with all the n-letter upper bound
expressions.
V. GAUSSIAN CHANNELS
In this section we provide a proof for Theorem 2. Note that the achievability of the rate pairs (R1, R2)
constrained by (12) and (13) follows that of those constrained by (6) and (7) by setting xi = ui + vi, where ui
and vi are independent N (0, Pi−Qi) and N (0, Qi) respectively for some 0 ≤ Qi ≤ Pi and i = 1, . . . ,M . For
the rest of the section, we shall focus on proving the converse result.
Considering proof by contradiction, let us assume that (Ro1, Ro2) is an achievable rate pair that lies outside the
rate region constrained by (12) and (13). Note that the maximum rate for message m1 is given by the right-hand
side of (12) by setting Qi = Pi for all i = 1, . . . ,M [4], and the maximum rate for message m2 is given by
the right-hand side of (13) by setting Qi = 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,M [1], [7]. Thus, without loss of generality we
may assume that R02 = R∗2 + δ for some δ > 0 where R∗2 is given by
max
(Q,R2)
R2
subject to Ro1 ≤
M∑
i=1
A
(1)
k,i(Q), ∀k = 1, . . . ,K (92)
R2 ≤
M∑
i=1
A
(2)
k,i (Q), ∀k = 1, . . . ,K (93)
Qi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,M (94)
Qi ≤ Pi, ∀i = 1, . . . ,M. (95)
For each k = 1, . . . ,K and i = 1, . . . ,M let αk, βk, M1,i and M2,i be the Lagrangians that correspond to the
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constrains (92)–(95) respectively, and let
L := R2 +
K∑
k=1
αk
[
M∑
i=1
A
(1)
k,i (Q)−R
o
1
]
+
K∑
k=1
βk
[
M∑
i=1
A
(2)
k,i (Q)−R2
]
+
M∑
i=1
M1,iQi +
M∑
i=1
M2,i(Pi −Qi).
(96)
It is straightforward to verify that the above optimization program that determines R∗2 is a convex program.
Therefore, taking partial derivatives of L over Qi, i = 1 . . . ,M and R2 respectively gives the following set of
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, which must be satisfied by any optimal solution (Q∗, R∗2):∑
k∈Yi
αk(Q
∗
i + σ
2
k,i)
−1 +
∑
k∈Zi
βk(Q
∗
i + σ
2
k,i)
−1 +M1,i =
(∑
k∈Yi
αk +
∑
k∈Zi
βk
)
(Q∗i + δ
2
i )
−1 +M2,i (97)
K∑
k=1
βk = 1 (98)
αk
[
M∑
i=1
A
(1)
k,i(Q
∗)−Ro1
]
= 0, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K (99)
βk
[
M∑
i=1
A
(2)
k,i(Q
∗)−R∗2
]
= 0, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K (100)
M1,iQ
∗
i = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,M (101)
M2,i(Pi −Q
∗
i ) = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,M (102)
αk, βk ≥ 0, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K (103)
M1,i,M2,i ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,M (104)
where
Yi := {k : σ
2
k,i < δ
2
i } and Zi := {k : σ2k,i > δ2i }. (105)
Note that δ > 0, so we have(
K∑
k=1
αk
)
Ro1 + R
o
2 >
(
K∑
k=1
αk
)
Ro1 +R
∗
2 (106)
=
K∑
k=1
(αkR
o
1 + βkR
∗
2) (107)
=
K∑
k=1
[
αk
M∑
i=1
A
(1)
k,i (Q
∗) + βk
M∑
i=1
A
(2)
k,i (Q
∗)
]
(108)
=
M∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
[
αkA
(1)
k,i (Q
∗) + βkA
(2)
k,i (Q
∗)
]
, (109)
where (107) follows from the KKT condition (98), and (108) follows from the KKT conditions (99) and (100).
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Next, we shall show that by assumption (Ro1, Ro2) is achievable, so we have(
K∑
k=1
αk
)
Ro1 +R
o
2 ≤
M∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
[
αkA
(1)
k,i (Q
∗) + βkA
(2)
k,i (Q
∗)
]
(110)
which is an apparent contradiction to (109) and hence will help to complete the proof of the theorem.
To prove (110), let us apply the converse part of Theorem 1 on (Ro1, Ro2) and write(
K∑
k=1
αk
)
Ro1 +R
o
2 ≤
(
K∑
k=1
αk
)
min
1≤k≤K
{
M∑
i=1
I(xi; yk,i|ui, zi)
}
+ min
1≤k≤K
{
M∑
i=1
I(ui; zi|yk,i)
}
(111)
≤
K∑
k=1
[
αk
M∑
i=1
I(xi; yk,i|ui, zi)
]
+
K∑
k=1
[
βk
M∑
i=1
I(ui; zi|yk,i)
]
(112)
=
M∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
[αkI(xi; yk,i|ui, zi) + βkI(ui; zi|yk,i)] , (113)
where (112) follows from the well-known fact that minimum is no more than any weighted mean. By the
degradedness assumption (3), we have
I(xi; yk,i|ui, zi) = I(xi; yk,i|ui)− I(xi; zi|ui) (114)
= h(yk,i|ui)− h(zi|ui)− h(nk,i) + h(wi) (115)
= h(yk,i|ui)− h(zi|ui)−
1
2
log
(
σ2k,i
δ2i
)
(116)
for any k ∈ Yi and I(xi; yk,i|ui, zi) = 0 for any k /∈ Yi. Similarly,
I(ui; zi|yk,i) = I(ui; zi)− (ui; yk,i) (117)
= h(zi)− h(yk,i)− h(zi|ui) + h(yk,i|ui) (118)
≤
1
2
log
(
Pi + δ
2
i
Pi + σ2k,i
)
− h(zi|ui) + h(yk,i|ui) (119)
for any k ∈ Zi, where (119) follows from the worst additive noise Lemma [20], and I(ui; zi|yk,i) = 0 for any
k /∈ Zi. Thus, for each i = 1, . . . ,M we have
K∑
k=1
[αkI(xi; yk,i|ui, zi) + βkI(ui; zi|yk,i)]
≤
∑
k∈Yi
αk
[
h(yk,i|ui)− h(zi|ui)−
1
2
log
(
σ2k,i
δ2i
)]
+
∑
k∈Zi
βk
[
1
2
log
(
Pi + δ
2
i
Pi + σ2k,i
)
− h(zi|ui) + h(yk,i|ui)
]
(120)
=
∑
k∈Yi
αkh(yk,i|ui) +
∑
k∈Zi
βkh(yk,i|ui)−
(∑
k∈Yi
αk +
∑
k∈Zi
βk
)
h(zi|ui)−
∑
k∈Yi
αk
2
log
(
σ2k,i
δ2i
)
+
∑
k∈Zi
βk
2
log
(
Pi + δ
2
i
Pi + σ2k,i
)
. (121)
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We have the following lemma, which is the scalar version of the extremal inequality established in [17,
Theorem 2].
Lemma 2: For any real scalars αk, βk, Q∗i , M1,i and M2,i that satisfy KKT conditions (97) and (101)–(104),
we have
∑
k∈Yi
αkh(yk,i|ui) +
∑
k∈Zi
βkh(yk,i|ui)−
(∑
k∈Yi
αk +
∑
k∈Zi
βk
)
h(zi|ui)
≤
∑
k∈Yi
αk
2
log(Q∗i + σ
2
k,i) +
∑
k∈Zi
βk
2
log(Q∗i + σ
2
k,i)−
∑
k∈Yi
αk +
∑
k∈Zi
βk
2
log(Q∗i + δ
2
i ) (122)
for any (ui, xi) that is independent of the additive Gaussian noise (n1,i, . . . , nK,i,wi) and such that E[x2i ] ≤ Pi.
✷
We note here that the extremal inequality in [17, Theorem 2] was established using a vector generalization
of Costa’s entropy-power inequality. The scalar version that we used here, however, can be directly established
using the original Costa’s entropy-power inequality [16]. Substituting (122) into (121) gives
K∑
k=1
[αkI(xi; yk,i|ui, zi) + βkI(ui; zi|yk,i)]
≤
∑
k∈Yi
αk
2
log(Q∗i + σ
2
k,i) +
∑
k∈Zi
βk
2
log(Q∗i + σ
2
k,i)−
∑
k∈Yi
αk +
∑
k∈Zi
βk
2
log(Q∗i + δ
2
i )−
∑
k∈Yi
αk
2
log
(
σ2k,i
δ2i
)
+
∑
k∈Zi
βk
2
log
(
Pi + δ
2
i
Pi + σ2k,i
)
(123)
=
∑
k∈Yi
αk
[
1
2
log
(
Q∗i + σ
2
k,i
σ2k,i
)
−
1
2
log
(
Q∗i + δ
2
i
δ2i
)]
+
∑
k∈Zi
βk
[
1
2
log
(
Pi + δ
2
i
Q∗i + δ
2
i
)
−
1
2
log
(
Pi + σ
2
k,i
Q∗i + σ
2
k,i
)]
(124)
=
K∑
k=1
[
αkA
(1)
k,i(Q
∗) + βkA
(2)
k,i(Q
∗)
]
. (125)
Further substituting (125) into (113) completes the proof of (110). We have thus completed the proof of
Theorem 2.
VI. FADING CHANNELS
To establish the connection to fading channels, first observe that Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 can be extended
in the following way. Consider the following scalar Gaussian broadcast channel with K + 1 users:
yk(t) = x(t) + nk(t) (126)
z(t) = x(t) + w(t), t = 1, . . . , T. (127)
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At each time sample t, the additive noise (n1(t), . . . , nK(t),w(t)) are independent zero-mean Gaussian with the
variances (σ21 , . . . , σ2K , δ2) selected at random as (σ21,i, . . . , σ2K,i, δ2i ) with probability pi, i = 1, . . . ,M . Both
the selection of the noise variances and the realization of the additive noise are assumed to be independent
across the time index t and revealed to all the terminals. We are interested in the ergodic scenario where the
duration T of communication can be arbitrarily large. The following extension of Thoerem 2 readily follows
and its proof will be omitted.
Corollary 2: For the scalar Gaussian broadcast channel considered above, the capacity region consists of all
rate pairs (R1, R2) that satisfy
R1≤ min
1≤k≤K
M∑
i=1
pi
[
1
2
log
(
Qi + σ
2
k,i
σ2k,i
)
−
1
2
log
(
Qi + δ
2
i
δ2i
)]+
(128)
R2≤ min
1≤k≤K
M∑
i=1
pi
[
1
2
log
(
Pi + δ
2
i
Qi + δ2i
)
−
1
2
log
(
Pi + σ
2
k,i
Qi + σ2k,i
)]+
(129)
for some 0 ≤ Qi ≤ Pi and i = 1, . . . ,M . ✷
Clearly if the fading coefficients in (17) are all discrete-valued, then the result in Theorem 3 follows
immediately from Corollary 2. When the fading coefficients are continuous valued, we can generalize Theorem 2
by suitably quantizing the channel gains.
First without loss of generality, we assume that each fading coefficient is real-valued, since each receiver can
cancel out the phase of the fading gain through a suitable multiplication at the receiver. Consider a discrete set
A := {A1, A2, . . . , AN , AN+1}
where Ai ≤ Ai+1, A1 := 0, AN := J and AN+1 :=∞ holds.
Given a set of channel gains (h1(i), . . . , hK(i), g(i)) in coherence block i, we discretize them to one of
(N + 1)K+1 states as described below.
• Encoding message m1: Suppose that the channel gain of receiver k satisfies Aq ≤ hk(i) ≤ Aq+1, then
we assume that the channel gain equals si,k = Aq . If the channel gain of the group 2 user satisfies
Aq ≤ g(i) ≤ Aq+1 then we assume that its channel gain equals s¯i,K+1 = Aq+1.
• Encoding message m2: Suppose that the channel gain of the group 2 receiver satisfies Aq ≤ g(i) ≤ Aq+1,
then we assume that the channel gain equals sK+1 = Aq . If the channel gain of a group 1 receiver satisfies
Aq ≤ hk(i) ≤ Aq+1 then we assume it equals s¯k = Aq+1.
Thus the channel gains in coherence block are mapped to one of L = (N +1)K+1 states {sj}Lj=1. We denote
the channel gains of the associated receivers in state sj as (sj,1, . . . , sj,K , sj,K+1) and the channel gains of the
associated eavesdroppers as (s¯j,1, . . . , s¯j,K+1). Note that in our notation, the K receivers in group 1 are labeled
{1, . . . ,K} while the group 2 receiver is labeled {K + 1}.
With the above quantization procedure it suffices to consider a coding scheme associated for L = (N+1)K+1
parallel channels, where each parallel channel corresponds to one state realization sj . Using Corollary 2 the
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following rate pair (R1, R2) is achievable:
R1 ≤ min
1≤k≤K
L∑
j=1
Pr(sj)A
(1)
j,k(sj) (130)
R2 ≤ min
1≤k≤K
L∑
j=1
Pr(sj)A
(2)
j,k(sj), (131)
where
A
(1)
j,k(sj) :=

 log 1 +Q(sj)|sj,k|
2
1 +Q(sj)|s¯j,K+1|2


+
(132)
A
(2)
j,k(sj) :=

log 1 + P (sj)|sj,K+1|
2
1 +Q(sj)|sj,K+1|2
−log
1 + P (sj)|s¯j,k|
2
1 +Q(sj)|s¯j,k|2


+
. (133)
For any J , taking the limit N →∞ we have that
L∑
j=1
Pr(sj)A
(1)
j,k(h, g)→
∮ J
0
∫ J
0
A
(1)
k (h, g)dF (g)dF (h) (134)
=
∮ J
0
∫ ∞
0
A
(1)
k (h, g)dF (g)dF (h) (135)
where
A
(1)
k (h, g) =

 log 1 +Q(h, g)|hk|
2
1 +Q(h, g)|g|2


+
,
and (135) follows from the fact that A(1)k (·) = 0 for s¯K+1 > J . Finally, by taking J arbitrarily large, the right
hand side in (130) approaches
R1 ≤ min
1≤k≤K
∮ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
A
(1)
k (h, g)dF (g)dF (h) (136)
as required. In a similar fashion the achievability of R2 can be established.
The converse follows by noticing that if the channel gains are revealed non-causally to the terminals, the
system reduces to a parallel channel model and the result in Theorem 2 immediately applies.
A. Numerical Results
In order to evaluate the achievable rate region, we assume that the fading gains are all sampled from
CN (0, 1). Furthermore instead of finding the optimal power allocation we assume a potentially sub-optimal
power allocation:
Q(h, g) =


P, |g|2 ≥ θ
0, |g|2 < θ.
(137)
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Fig. 2: Achievable rates (nats/symbol) for the two groups at different SNR values. The x-axis shows the rate
R1 for group 1 whereas the y-axis shows the rate R2 for group 2.
where θ is a certain fixed parameter and assume that P (h, g) = P for all values of (h, g). Notice that
our power allocation does not depend on the channel gains of the receivers in group 1.This is a reasonable
simplification when K is large and the channel gains (h1, . . . , hK) are identically distributed. The achievable
rate expressions (19) and (20) reduce to:
R1 ≤ Pr(|g |
2 ≤ θ)E



 log 1 + P |h|
2
1 + P |g |2


+∣∣∣∣∣∣|g |2 ≤ θ

 (138)
R2 ≤ Pr(|g |
2 ≥ θ)E



 log 1 + P |g |
2
1 + P |h|2


+∣∣∣∣∣∣|g |2 ≥ θ

 (139)
In Fig. 2, we plot the achievable rates for P ∈ {2, 10, 100}. We make the following observations:
• The corner points for R1 and R2 are obtained by setting θ =∞ and θ = 0 respectively. By symmetry of
the rate expressions in (138) and (139), it is clear that both the corner points evaluate to the same numerical
constant.
• As we approach the corner point (0, R2) the boundary of the capacity region is nearly flat. Any coherence
block, where |g(i)| ≤ min1≤k≤K |hk(i)| is clearly not useful to the group 2 receiver. By transmitting m1
in these slots one can increase the rate R1 without decreasing R2.
• As we approach the corner point (R1, 0), the boundary of the capacity region is nearly vertical. The
argument is very similar to the previous case. In any period where |g(i)| ≥ max1≤k≤K |hk(i)| one cannot
transmit to group 1. By transmitting m2 in these slots we increase R2 without decreasing R1.
• We observe that a natural alternative to the proposed scheme is time-sharing. The rate achieved by such
a scheme corresponds to a straight line connecting the corner points. The rate-loss associated with such a
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scheme is significant compared to the proposed scheme.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We establish the optimality of a superposition construction for private broadcasting of two messages to two
groups of receivers over independent parallel channels, when there are an arbitrary number of receivers in group
1 but there is only one receiver in group 2. We observe that in the optimal construction the codewords of
group 2 must constitute the “cloud centers” whereas the codewords of group 1 must constitute the “satellite
codewords”. For the case of Gaussian sub-channels the optimality of Gaussian codebooks is established. This
is accomplished by obtaining a Lagrangian dual for each point on the boundary of the capacity region and
then using an extremal inequality to show that the resulting expression is maximized using a Gaussian input
distribution. An extension to block-fading channels is also discussed. Numerical results for Rayleigh-fading
channels indicate that the proposed scheme can provide significant performance gains over naive time-sharing
techniques.
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